Short CV

Education:

1997 Master Degree in Philosophy, University of Genoa, Italy

1998-99 Diplôme d'Études Superiéures, University of Geneva, Switzerland

2001/2 Visiting student at the University of Stanford, USA

2004 PhD in Philosophy of Language, University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy

Current position: 

Associate Professor of Philosophy of Language, Section of Philosophy, DAFIST, University of Genoa, Italy

Research areas: 

Philosophy of Language, Methodology of Philosophy, Metaphysics

Selected papers

Domaneschi, F., D'Agruma, N., Vignolo, M., and Rodriguez Ronderos, C. (forthcoming). Eye-tracking evidence for the causal-historical theory of reference. Linguistics and Philosophy.

Vignolo, M. (2024). What is said and lying. Erkenntnis 89: 2703-2732. 200, 124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00648-1

Vignolo, M. (2022). Minimal contents, lies, and conventions of language. Synthese 200, 124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03609-x

Domaneschi, F. and Vignolo, M. (2021). Intuitions on semantic reference. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13: 755-778. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00560-7

Vignolo, M. (2021). The lying test, ambiguity, and determination of content. Theoria 87, 3: 847-857. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12302

Domaneschi, F. and Vignolo, M. (2020). Reference and the ambiguity of truth-value judgments. Mind & Language 35, 4: 440-455. http://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12254

Domaneschi, F. and Vignolo, M. (2018). Referential intuitions are still problematic. Analysis 78, 3: 472–483. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx148

Kristan, A. and Vignolo, M. (2018). Assessment sensitivity in legal discourse. Inquiry 61, 4: 394-421. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1371874

Domaneschi, F., Vignolo, M., and Di Paola, S. (2017). Testing the causal theory of reference. Cognition 161: 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.014

Vignolo, M. (2015). Dummett’s legacy: semantics, metaphysics, and linguistic competence, Disputatio 7, 41: 207-229. https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0011

Vignolo, M. (2015). Saving uniqueness. Philosophia 43: 1177-1198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9643-1

Vignolo, M. (2014). What incompleteness arguments are and what they are not. Ratio XXVII, 2: 123-139.  https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12036

Vignolo, M. (2012). Referential/Attributive: The explanatory gap of the contextualist theory. Dialectica 66: 621–633. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12003