Short CV

Education:

1997 Master Degree in Philosophy, University of Genoa, Italy

1998-99 Diplôme d'Études Superiéures, University of Geneva, Switzerland

2001/2 Visiting student at the University of Stanford, USA

2004 PhD in Philosophy of Language, University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy

Current position: 

Associate Professor of Philosophy of Language, Section of Philosophy, DAFIST, University of Genoa, Italy

Research areas: 

Philosophy of Language, Methodology of Philosophy, Metaphysics

Selected papers

Vignolo, M. (forthcoming). The semantic commitment of liars. Philosophical Quarterly.

Domaneschi, F., D'Agruma, N., Rodriguez Ronderos, C., and Vignolo, M. (forthcoming). Eye-tracking evidence for the causal-historical theory of reference. Linguistics and Philosophy.

Vignolo, M. (2024). What is said and lying. Erkenntnis 89: 2703-2732. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00648-1

Vignolo, M. (2022). Minimal contents, lies, and conventions of language. Synthese 200, 124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03609-x 

Domaneschi, F. and Vignolo, M. (2021). Intuitions on semantic reference. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13: 755-778. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00560-7

Vignolo, M. (2021). The lying test, ambiguity, and determination of content. Theoria 87, 3: 847-857. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12302

Domaneschi, F. and Vignolo, M. (2020). Reference and the ambiguity of truth-value judgments. Mind & Language 35, 4: 440-455. http://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12254

Domaneschi, F. and Vignolo, M. (2018). Referential intuitions are still problematic. Analysis 78, 3: 472–483. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx148

Kristan, A. and Vignolo, M. (2018). Assessment sensitivity in legal discourse. Inquiry 61, 4: 394-421. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1371874

Domaneschi, F., Vignolo, M., and Di Paola, S. (2017). Testing the causal theory of reference. Cognition 161: 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.014

Vignolo, M. (2015). Dummett’s legacy: semantics, metaphysics, and linguistic competence, Disputatio 7, 41: 207-229. https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0011

Vignolo, M. (2015). Saving uniqueness. Philosophia 43: 1177-1198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9643-1

Vignolo, M. (2014). What incompleteness arguments are and what they are not. Ratio XXVII, 2: 123-139.  https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12036

Vignolo, M. (2012). Referential/Attributive: The explanatory gap of the contextualist theory. Dialectica 66: 621–633. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12003